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1. Jurisdictional issues 
 
1.1. General jurisdiction rules  
The concept of cybercrime tends to provoke lively discussions with regard to jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, Belgian criminal law does not include jurisdictional provisions which are spe-
cifically aimed at cybercrime. General provisions regarding jurisdiction can be found in arti-
cles 3 and 4 of the Belgian Criminal Code, hereinafter referred to as CC, the former introduc-
ing the general territoriality principle which implies the applicability of Belgian criminal law 
to offences committed on Belgian territory, whilst the latter entails the possibility of its ex-
traterritorial application, be it limited to those instances when such is explicitly provided for 
by law. These extraterritorial provisions (at least the general principles thereof) can be found 
in the second chapter of the Preliminary Title to the Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure, 
hereinafter referred to as PT CCP. However, it must be stressed that the possibility of extra-
territorial jurisdiction for these specific crimes is only linked to cybercrime with regard to 
child pornography as provided by article 10ter PT CCP jo. 383 bis §§1 and 3 CC. 
1.2. General localization theory 
In light of the application of the territoriality principle enshrined in article 3 CC to cyber-
crime, it is of the utmost importance to determine when a cybercrime can be considered to 
have taken place on Belgian territory. Here, rather than introduce a specific theory of locali-
zation targeting crimes committed in cyberspace, the generally applicable theory of localiza-
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tion is wielded. This general theory, known as the ubiquity doctrine, determines that an of-
fence is committed on Belgian territory - thus falling under the scope of Belgian criminal law 
- as soon as a physical act which makes up a constitutive element of the offence, takes place 
on Belgian territory. The broad nature of this theory provides the possibility of establishing 
jurisdiction over a cybercrime without necessarily determining the location of the user, the 
provider of the location where the information or evidence is held. 
In other words, no specific theory for determining the locus delicti of offences committed in 
cyberspace exists. In order to determine whether or not a cybercrime can be said to have 
taken place on Belgian territory, it must be established whether a constitutive element of 
the said offence took place on Belgian territory.    
Nevertheless, examples of cases where the application of the ubiquity doctrine does not 
provide sufficient (legal) clarity are easy to come by. Consider, for example, the crime of 
hate speech. The question arises whether hate speech can be considered to be an offence 
committed on Belgian territory any time a computer screen, located on Belgian soil, show-
cases the messages of an instigator/perpetrator, located abroad, perhaps even at the other 
side of the world. Similarly, the question arises whether the offence would be located in Bel-
gium when those called upon by the instigator choose to follow command and cause dam-
age. Finally, the question arises to what extent specific targeting is required, e.g. because the 
hate speech calls specifically for riots in a Belgian city or because it is formulated in a Belgian 
national language. The legal uncertainty resulting from the lack of a specific localization the-
ory and of specific jurisdictional rules in relation to cybercrime, are to be considered prob-
lematic, as the above examples illustrate. 
1.3. Conflicts of jurisdiction 
The possibility of a broad territorial jurisdiction claim, implied by the ubiquity doctrine, can 
give way to positive conflicts of jurisdiction. This statement is particularly true since Belgian 
law, for certain offences, considers the public nature of certain material elements of the of-
fence (or the fact that publicity has been given to certain words, images etc or that there has 
been a certain spread thereof) as a constitutive element in itself. This is e.g. the case in the 
context of violations of sexual morals, or in the case of certain forms of incitement to vio-
lence or hatred (e.g. racial or ethnic) or condoning, denying or grossly trivializing (WWII) 
genocide. Consequently – applied to the reality of the information society – the public na-
ture or character for such offences (through cyber or ICT media) may well prompt Belgian 
territorial jurisdiction over them, even if it would seem reasonable in exercising jurisdiction 
to take account of whether the perpetrator effectively intended or targeted publicity on Bel-
gian soil. To the extent that (many) other states have comparable legislation, major positive 
jurisdiction conflicts are theoretically likely to arise. 
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Regardless of this substantial possibility for jurisdictional conflicts, Belgian criminal law does 
not provide specific rules with regard to their prevention or settlement, other than through 
the so called denunciation on the basis of mutual legal assistance treaties in place.3 Belgium 
is not a party to the Council of Europe European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings 
in Criminal Matters.  
1.4. Universal jurisdiction? 
The absence of cybercrime-specific jurisdictional principles does not necessarily imply uni-
versal jurisdiction. The enforcement of universal jurisdiction to cybercrime in general is to be 
avoided, for it not only gives way to serious conflicts of jurisdiction but will additionally 
cause significant problems regarding mutual legal assistance, particularly when there is an 
asymmetry in the criminal nature of the offence between the requesting and the requested 
state.  
2. Substantive criminal law 
 
2.1. Offence definitions 
Jurisdictional provisions (which in general can be found in the second part of the PT CCP) are 
separate from provisions containing offence definitions as well as from provisions relation to 
participation, which can be found in the CC or special laws. In other words, definitions of 
(cybercrime) offences and provisions concerning participation4 in these offences do not con-
tain jurisdictional elements. When regarding the matter from a substantive rather than a 
procedural viewpoint, it can be noted that the offence definitions are not endowed with a 
transnational dimension either. The provisions included in the Belgian CC do not differenti-
ate between national and transnational offences. They provide an open formulation of the 
offence definition, which can thus be applied to national and transnational offences alike.   
2.2. Criminalizing cybercrime 
Cybercrime offences often include a foreign element. This must be taken into account when 
considering whether or not it is preferable for states to criminalize cybercrime offences. A 
number of difficulties are likely to arise. Reference can be made to the difference between 
criminalizing the consumer and the provider. For a state to regulate the acts of e.g. a person, 
located on its territory, who consciously and deliberately engages in an act which is illegal in 
that country by means of a personal computer, e.g. watching child pornography or online 
purchasing of pepper spray, seems perfectly reasonable. For a state to equally criminalize 
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the provider of this content, residing outside its territory and having no link with the state 
other than providing content to a computer screen which is physically located in its territory, 
is likely to be problematic, however. In such cases, the question arises whether the state in 
which the provider acts, considers these actions criminal. If the answer is positive and both 
states consider the actions of the provider illegal, minimal problems occur, likely to be lim-
ited to a positive conflict of jurisdiction. However, when the answer to the forgoing question 
is negative and consequently the double criminality test fails, difficulties in having mutual 
legal assistance requests executed are likely, at least when the measures requested are co-
ercive in nature, or intrusive, or potentially impact on the privacy of the person concerned. 
Given the universality-like nature of the criminalization of acts posed on the territory of an-
other state, it seems preferable for an international or at least regional (e.g. EU) framework 
to guide states’ national legislation in this matter. Problems would at least be diminished if 
e.g. EU member states were to agree for certain offences to criminalize the actions of the 
provider throughout the EU. If EU member states would individually criminalize provider 
actions in or onto other member states’ territory, the question e.g. arises whether this 
would not contradict with the right of free movement (of services), a principle that is fun-
damental to the functioning of the internal market. 
2.3. Internet providers as criminally liable legal persons 
The Belgian CC provides a legal basis for criminal responsibility of legal persons. Article 5 CC 
introduces a general principle of criminal liability for legal persons, which can be applied to 
cybercrime offences. The open formulation of the said article does not differentiate between 
a national and an international legal person.  
However, concerning jurisdictional issues regarding legal persons, reference must be made 
to article 12bis PT CCP. This provision provides automatic implementation of mandatory ju-
risdictional rules embedded in secondary EU legislation, meaning that no additional Belgian 
implementation legislation is required in such cases. In other words, provisions concerning 
mandatory jurisdiction to prescribe included in (amongst others) EU Framework Decisions 
and Directives are automatically applicable. As a result, Belgian authorities are competent to 
prosecute and convict legal persons whose headquarters are located on Belgian territory for 
various EU core crimes, including racism,5 attacks on information systems,6 corruption7 and 
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counterfeiting.8 The jurisdictional competence remains intact, even when the offence is 
committed by a daughter corporation outside the Belgian territory.9  
 
3. Cooperation in criminal matters  
The rise of information technology, such as e.g. low and medium earth orbiting satellites and 
foreign servers, has profoundly impacted upon the nature of mutual legal assistance. It has 
created a need for cooperation and mutual legal assistance where no such need existed be-
fore by adding an international dimension to situations which formerly were purely national.  
For instance, mutual legal assistance may even be required when a Belgian authority wishes 
to perform a telephone tap on a conversation between two Belgian nationals both located 
on Belgian territory, if routed through a satellite-based personal communication system. This 
because the technical point for interception may now be located outside of the Belgian bor-
ders, i.e. in a ground station of a low or medium earth orbit satellite constellation, located 
abroad. Another example concerns criminals or criminal organizations setting up construc-
tions and hosting illegal websites through (multiple) foreign servers to avoid detection. This 
represents another example of a case where a criminal investigation will require mutual le-
gal assistance. These simple examples clarify the effect of increasingly complex technological 
advancements on the nature and scope of mutual legal assistance. 
3.1. Interception of telecommunication 
Within the national framework, article 90ter CCP provides a competence for the Belgian in-
vestigative judge to intercept (wireless) telecommunication. The concept of “telecommuni-
cation” is described as ‘private and telecommunication’.10 This is a broad concept, including 
amongst others  telephone conversations, email and voicemail. 
The possibility of exercising this competence is subjected to the fulfillment of three strict 
conditions. First and foremost, interception can only take place when there are serious rea-
                                                            
8 Article 9 §1 (c) Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and 
counterfeiting of noncash means of payment, European Union: Council of the European Union 28 
May 2001. 
9 Other framework decisions refer to Member States establishing jurisdiction when a legal person is  
“established in the territory of that Member State.” See e.g. article 8 § 1 (c) Council Framework Deci-
sion 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements 
of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, article 7 § 1 (c) Council Framework 
Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime, article 4 § 1 (c) 
Council Framework Decision of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to 
prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, Article 17 § 2 (b) Directive 
2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011  on combating the 
sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA. 
10 Article 90ter §1 CCP. 
6 
 
sons to believe that the suspect committed one of the crimes included in a limitative list.11 
The offences included in the said list are of a grave and serious nature and include, amongst 
others, murder, trafficking in human beings, taking of hostages and kidnapping. Second, this 
must be considered a subsidiary measure, seeing how the possibility of interception is made 
reliant upon the insufficiency of other measures. Third, interception is only to be used reac-
tively, meaning that the measure is applied in the presumption that one of the aforemen-
tioned offences has already taken place, rather than to prevent it.  
In a European context, Belgian law provides for the possibility of interception of wireless 
communication in accordance with the EU MLA Convention.12 
As Belgian criminal law is familiar with concepts of interception of telecommunication and 
mutual legal assistance, it is feasible for Belgian judicial authorities to provide mutual legal 
assistance concerning interception of telecommunication vis-à-vis non – EU – member 
states. 
3.2. Refusal grounds 
With regard to refusal grounds concerning internet searches and other similar computer and 
network searches, national law remains silent. Simultaneously, Belgium is bound by refusal 
grounds derived from treaty law, more specifically those enumerated by article 27 § 4 of the 
2001 Convention on Cybercrime.  
For most forms of cooperation between the EU member states, the double criminality re-
quirement has been lifted for a set of offences, including computer related crime in general 
as well as e.g. child pornography, incitement to terrorism, racism and xenophobia as content 
specific cybercrime offences. As a result, in spite of the diversity in the national criminaliza-
tion provisions, states will not be able to call on that diversity to refuse cooperation. For rea-
sons of completeness, reference can also be made to the more recent possibility to issue a 
declaration clarifying the scope of the offences for which double criminality has been lifted. 
In the cooperation with Germany, the use of the European Evidence Warrant is limited along 
the cybercrime definition found in the related framework decision, complemented with the 
definition included in the Council of Europe Convention.  
3.3. Extraterritorial investigations 
In principle, Belgian investigators can only exercise powers on foreign territory to the extent 
that mutual legal assistance arrangements allow them to do so. Clearly, there is no legisla-
tion allowing self-service abroad in general. However, in the specific context of information 
systems, reference must be made to article 88ter CCP, authorizing – under certain condi-
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tions13 – the extension of a search ordered by the investigating judge in an information sys-
tem (or a part thereof) to an information system (or a part thereof) located in a different 
place than where the search physically takes place, to the extent that the persons mandated 
to use the original information system to which the search pertains, have access to the in-
formation system (or part thereof) located in the different place. Unlike when the data ac-
cessed in this way appear to be located on Belgian territory (in which case the data con-
cerned can not only be seized, copied, blocked, made inaccessible and even removed on the 
basis of article 39bis CCP), data located abroad may only be copied, in which case the com-
petent authorities of the foreign country (provided that the latter can be reasonably identi-
fied) will be informed thereof through the Belgian ministry of justice. Finally, accession of 
publicly available information is considered unproblematic.  
3.4. Databases and information exchange 
Regarding information exchange, Belgium is a party to the 2007 PNR Agreement between 
the United States of America and the European Union,14 as well as to the 2010 TFTP2 
Agreement.15 In accordance with article 35 of the 2001 Cybercrime Convention, the Federal 
Computer Crime Unit (FCCU), which is part of the federal judicial police’s Direction for Com-
bating Economic and Financial Crime, functions as a 24/7 call unit.  
Furthermore, Belgium is a founding member of the 2005 Prüm Treaty, which entails a possi-
bility of direct consultation of or automated (hit/no-hit based) comparison of data (finger-
prints, vehicle registration data, DNA profiles) contained in national databases, without a 
need for a request. In 2008, the Prüm Decision16 incorporated this instrument into the EU-
acquis. With regard to the consultation of and contribution to international databases, Bel-
gium frequently works with Interpol, the Visa Information System (VIS), the Schengen Infor-
mation System (SIS), Eurodac, Europol and Eurojust, under the conditions set forth by their 
legal framework.  
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A possible future initiative worth mentioning is the European Police Records Index System, 
also known under its acronym “EPRIS”.17 This proposal is aimed towards developing a hit/no 
hit database, similar to the Prüm system, in order to find out if and where in the EU certain 
relevant (in particular suspect-related) information is available in criminal investigation da-
tabases. 
3.5. Notice and take-down 
Belgian criminal law is familiar with the concept of the notice and take-down of websites in 
as far as it is foreseen in an international instrument, e.g. Article 35 jo. 40 of the Prüm Con-
vention. Additionally, article 39bis §3 CCP provides Belgian judicial authorities, more specifi-
cally the public prosecutor, with the competence to take down (‘to make inaccessible’) a 
website containing information that is to be considered criminal or contrary to public order 
and common decency.  
An international enforcement system with regard to take-down decisions relating to cyber-
crime on a regional level (in particular the EU) seems feasible. In this case, an EU-instrument 
could serve as a legal basis for the concept. Given the kick-off as per the 1st of 2013 of the 
European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), hosted by Europol, such evolution would even seem a 
logical next step. EC3 will be the focal point in the EU’s fight against cybercrime (encompass-
ing in an initial stage: online fraud, online child sexual exploitation and cybercrime affecting 
critical infrastructure and information systems in the EU), contributing to faster reactions in 
the event of online crimes, supporting both member states and the EU’s institutions in build-
ing operational and analytical capacity for investigations and cooperation with international 
partners. 
4. Human rights concerns 
Although the involvement of information technology in criminal investigations can certainly 
be described as relevant from a human rights perspective, no specification of the legal con-
sequences of the usage of such technology has yet been made explicit.  
With regard to evidence collected by another state in violation of international human rights 
standards, reference must be made to Article 13 of the Belgian law of 9 December 2004 con-
cerning international mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. This provision lists specific 
circumstances which imply exclusion before a Belgian court of evidence gathered unlawfully 
abroad. This is the case when the unlawfulness bears the mark of manifest illegality on ac-
count of infringement of essential procedural requirements according to the law of the state 
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where the evidence was gathered or affects the reliability of the evidence. It does not follow 
from that, however, that all other unlawful foreign evidence will be per se admissible or not 
eligible for exclusion. The latter contrast with the applicable jurisprudence concerning na-
tionally gathered evidence. Here the 2003 Antigoon Case, adjudged by the Belgian Cour de 
Cassation, establishes that nationally gathered irregular or unlawful evidence can remain 
admissible, provided the irregularities neither result in absolute nullity, nor impact the relia-
bility of the evidence or the rights of the defense. This approach, which showcases a clear 
difference  between unlawful evidence gathered abroad and domestically (minimum and 
therefore non-limitative exclusion conditions for foreign unlawful evidence vs limited inad-
missibility grounds for national unlawful or irregular evidence), implies that the exclusion of 
evidence due to irregularities or unlawfulness is more likely to occur when such evidence is 
gathered by foreign authorities.  
5. Future developments 
 
5.1. Cross-border contact 
Taking into consideration articles 10 and 11 of the EU MLA Convention,18 the following is to 
be said concerning the influence of modern technology on cross-border contact. Due to the 
guarantees set forth by the classical rules on mutual assistance, it is essential that these be 
applied to all contact with the accused as well as with witnesses during a trial. These guaran-
tees are less of an issue with regard to victims. Here, modern technology could, for instance, 
allow a victim to follow the trial from a distance. With regard to an investigation, it is con-
ceivable that a police officer uses telecommunication equipment instead of sending out a 
mutual legal assistance request, provided that there is no pressure or coercion to provide 
information. It is, for example, perfectly feasible that a Belgian police officer simply calls a 
Dutch victim in search of information, provided he or she doesn’t pressure the victim in 
question.  
Further, a possible application of the aut exequi, aut tolerare principle19 seems like an attrac-
tive possibility. This principle entails that a state, when unwilling to execute a mutual legal 
assistance request for capacity reasons, must tolerate the execution of investigative 
measures (e.g. hearings) on its territory by the competent authorities of another state. 
Though this principle may sound revolutionary, accepting the competence of foreign author-
ities to operate on their territory is already accepted in cross-border surveillance or hot-
pursuit situations, and is also used in the context of setting up joint investigation teams. The 
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acceptability of applying this new principle in this particular context could be increased con-
sidering that new technologies allow execution of these measures without actively entering 
the territory of the other state. 
5.2. Skype 
Skype does not provide adequate guarantees required for a videoconference. As such, it is 
not advisable to use Skype-technology to set up hearings via screen in transnational cases. 
Skype-technology could be used as an alternative for telephone hearings. The scope for tel-
ephone hearings is much more narrow compared to video hearings, seeing how much of the 
non-verbal communication – essential when adjudging the reliability of a witness – is lost.    
5.3. Other issues  
 
Additional issues, brought about by technological advancement, concern mostly the possibil-
ity for (potential) offenders to remain undetected. Pre-paid SIM cards, which require no reg-
istration, allow for perpetrators to make phone calls which are untraceable, a phenomenon 
that completely undermines any regulation concerning interception of telecommunications. 
Equally untraceable is internet use through hot spots using alternating IP addresses, e.g. in 
airports. VoIP, also known as voice over IP, allows telephone calls using the internet. When 
using VoIP from a hot spot, these conversation may well remain impossible to trace. Fur-
thermore, detection on the internet can easily be dodged, especially by using the Tor Brows-
er, but also by simply installing an IP-shielder. Even using the “incognito-mode” readily pro-
vided by Google Chrome is rendering law enforcement more difficult.  
 
Other challenges, because largely unregulated, are cross-border observation through camera 
use, spy drones and environmental taps (from a distance, e.g. through laser measuring of 
window vibration and deducting voice from that). 
